DEEP RESEARCH · UNISON

Unison: Financial First Aid and the 10MW Offshore-Wind Transition

A 3Q 2025 review of financial structure, utilization, order backlog, and the R&D roadmap.

Published: 2025-12-06 · Wind company analysis · Naver Blog source

0. Bottom line first

Official fact: The source is based on the Naver Blog original and Unison IR/policy materials.

Interpretation: Design certification for the 10MW offshore turbine is positive, but financial risk remains the key variable until 2026 prototype installation, type certification, and backlog-to-revenue conversion are proven.

1. Identity and governance changes

Unison was founded in September 1984 and listed on KOSDAQ in November 1993. It moved from plants/construction materials into wind power in the early 2000s. Its Sacheon plant can produce 500MW of turbines and more than 300 tower sets per year.

• In 2004, it developed Korea's first 750kW gearless wind system.
• It later commercialized 2MW, 2.3MW, 4.2MW, and 4.3MW low-wind-speed turbines.
• Control moved to Toshiba in 2012 and then to Anemoi under Samchully Asset Management in 2020.
• On February 12, 2025, it was officially excluded from the Samchully corporate group.

At end-September 2025, shares outstanding totaled 221,714,182. Large rights offerings in 2024-2025 increased capital from KRW 63.1bn at end-2023 to KRW 110.8bn at end-September 2025.

2. Business status: backlog versus low utilization

In 3Q 2025, the wind-power business represented 100% of consolidated revenue at KRW 35.7bn. That was up about 86% year over year, but still below 2023 full-year revenue of KRW 107.7bn.

• At end-September 2025, total orders were KRW 141.8bn.
• After KRW 35.7bn delivered, backlog was KRW 106.1bn.
• Main models are 4.2MW U136 and 4.3MW U151.
• Those models have been supplied to large projects including the 60.2MW Omisan wind farm.

Official fact: Sacheon turbine-equipment utilization was 10.5% in 3Q 2025. Available production value was KRW 181.9bn, while actual utilization value was KRW 19.1bn. Imported plate steel was KRW 1,080/kg, up from KRW 950 the prior year.

Interpretation: Low utilization magnifies depreciation and labor costs. Without fast backlog conversion, profitability remains difficult.

3. New businesses and R&D roadmap

3Q 2025 cumulative R&D expense was KRW 10.7bn, equal to 30.07% of revenue. About 79%, or KRW 8.47bn, was capitalized as development cost. That signals commercialization expectations but also creates impairment risk.

• The core project is the 10MW U210 offshore wind system.
• After selection as a national-project lead in 2022, it obtained international design certification in February 2025.
• U210 is a direct-drive gearless model with a 210m rotor diameter.
• Prototype installation and international type certification are targeted for 2026.
• 4.4MW and 4.5MW models obtained international type certification in 2022-2023.
• A 20MW+ offshore turbine basic-design national project for 2025-2029 is cited.
• It was also selected for a 6MW onshore turbine development project in September 2025.

4. Financial position: better liquidity, still fragile

3Q 2025 cumulative revenue was KRW 35.7bn, operating loss was KRW 6.26bn, and net loss was KRW 16.23bn. Interest-bearing debt is heavy, including KRW 70.5bn of short-term borrowings and KRW 52.0bn of convertible bonds.

• In September 2025, Unison issued 51mn shares through a shareholder rights offering and raised about KRW 42.9bn.
• In July 2025, it sold all Omisan Wind Power shares and secured about KRW 11.0bn of cash.
• The sale was below book value and caused about KRW 6.1bn of other bad-debt expense/loss.
• In May 2025, it issued KRW 37.6bn of 17th private convertible bonds to refinance the 14th issue.

5. Policy opportunity and structural threats

Korea's renewable-policy targets create opportunity: 20% renewable generation by 2030, 95% of new facilities from clean energy, 12GW offshore wind by 2030, and a 300-unit domestic-turbine target. Large public projects such as Southwest Jeonbuk at 2.4GW and Shinan at 8.2GW can also help.

Risks remain. If Vestas and other global players build Korean factories and satisfy local-content rules, domestic protection weakens. Permitting delays, resident acceptance, and grid-connection constraints can also delay backlog conversion.

6. My conclusion and watchpoints

• Whether backlog converts into break-even-level revenue in 4Q 2025 and 1H 2026.
• Whether the 10MW turbine prototype and demonstration tests proceed as planned.
• Whether roughly KRW 19.5bn of cash can cover upcoming CB repayments and operating costs.
• Whether dilution recurs through additional rights offerings or debt.

In conclusion, Unison has the policy logic of domestic wind localization, but it needs cost cuts, utilization recovery, and 10MW commercialization to turn that logic into financial results.